Three Millennia Ago, an Israelite King Conquered a Phoenician Dye Factory on the Mediterranean Coast

The Hebrew Bible makes frequent mention of argaman, wool dyed purple with a specific substance, as a key material for the priestly vestments, the tabernacle, and other items of high status. In ancient Rome, the same dye, imported from the Levant, was a symbol of royalty. Investigating an ancient site in the city of Haifa, Israeli archaeologists believe they have discovered an ancient factory for the pigment’s production:

The purple dye is created from a gland found in three kinds of sea snails, commonly called rock snails or murex, found along Israel’s coast. The dye likely created both the argaman (purple) and t’khelet (blue) referred to in the Hebrew Bible. The color is so strong that it can stay fixed for thousands of years, meaning dyed fibers from 3,000 years ago maintain their vibrant hue.

The dye factory is located at Tel Shiqmona on the southern end of Haifa’s coast. The settlement remains had previously confounded archaeologists: it was first settled in the Bronze Age, around 1500 BCE, but was quite small compared to other settlements at the time. It was also located far from agricultural lands and next to an area of rocky coast that was unlikely to be useful for maritime trade.

More recent excavations over the past five years . . . found evidence of Israelite settlement that led them to believe that the site was conquered by the kingdom of Israel [from the Phoenicians] around the mid-9th century BCE. Around the time the biblical King Ahab ascended the throne, the dye factory was destroyed and rebuilt. The archaeologists found Phoenician pottery from after the rebuild, showing that Phoenicians were likely still living there. They also uncovered Israelite-style fortified walls, Israelite seals, and four-room houses that were common to Israelite architecture at the time.

Read more at Times of Israel

More about: Ancient Israel, Archaeology, Phoenicia, T'khelet

 

When It Comes to Iran, Israel Risks Repeating the Mistakes of 1973 and 2023

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.

Read more at Hudson Institute

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran nuclear program, Israeli Security, Yom Kippur War