Born into an aristocratic Scottish family in 1751, Lord George Gordon was elected to Parliament in 1774, where he developed a reputation for eccentricity, political unreliability, and staunch support for granting the American colonies their independence. His political career came to an end in 1780, when he led protests against a bill extending limited civil rights to Catholics, which deteriorated into destructive riots. Gordon was arrested for treason and spent nine months in the Tower of London before being acquitted on grounds of insanity. During his imprisonment, his story grows more interesting still, as Mia Amran writes:

There is no known reason that Lord George Gordon decided, in these nine months of uncertainty, that Judaism was the path for him. . . . We do know that Gordon exchanged some letters with other Jews during those months, seeking to learn more about the religion. He also started [studying] Hebrew and petitioned the London Jewish community for political and financial support. Some actually say that his conversion was done purely out of greed. His main electorate had until now been the working class, and he possibly hoped to raise funds within the Jewish community to help secure a more affluent borough in the next elections.

Either way, by the end of his nine-month trial, he had written to Rabbi Tevele Schiff of Duke Street Synagogue, the chief rabbi of London, asking to be accepted as a Jew. He was declined. Rabbi Schiff was unclear about Gordon’s motives and turned the eccentric former MP away. But this didn’t deter Gordon. He instead traveled north to Birmingham, where another large Jewish community resided. After donating 100 pounds—a significant amount of money in those days, to the Singer’s Hill synagogue—he was given the honor of reading a mishe-beirakh (benediction) in synagogue, and Birmingham’s Rabbi Jacob agreed to convert him.

Gordon underwent circumcision, studied Torah, started praying daily, grew a beard, donned a kippah, and started keeping the laws of Shabbat and kashrut. Once an accepted member of the Jewish community, he returned to London where he attended synagogue services and again brought community acceptance with some generous financial contributions.

Gordon lived the rest of his life—which was no less colorful—as a devout Jew, using the name Yisrael Ben Avraham Avinu. He died of typhus in the Newgate Prison in 1793.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.