“They shall suck of the abundance of the seas, and of treasures hid in the sand.” So reads the blessing Moses gives to the tribe of Zebulon in the penultimate chapter of Deuteronomy. Students of the ancient Near East have in recent years used the latest technology to dig not just under the ground, but also on the bottom of the Mediterranean to get a better sense of these ancient treasures. Leading the effort is Assaf Yasur-Landau, the director of the University of Haifa’s Institute for Maritime Studies. Melanie Lidman writes:

In May, Yasur-Landau oversaw the first excavations of two shipwrecks in the Dor Beach lagoon, one from the Persian period, from around 550 BCE, and one from the Iron Age, around 1000 BCE. During the three-week dive season, [he and his team] uncovered pieces of pottery from 3,000 years ago and are trying to determine if they’ve discovered the infrastructure for an early port or just the detritus of old shipwrecks, Yasur-Landau said. In the fall, they will dive again for another three-week season to try to explore the ruins further.

Israel has always been a hub for marine activity, from the first Mediterranean fishing villages dating from around 10,000 BCE to ancient Roman ports like Caesarea to the ships filled with Jewish refugees trying to evade the British blockade after World War II.

But excavating items and ships that sank to the sea floor thousands of years ago is a much more complicated process than excavating an archaeological site on land. It’s also far more expensive, requiring boats, sand dredgers, scuba equipment, and a highly trained team with a very specific skill set. . . . But while underwater conditions are challenging, they’re also exceptionally good at preserving things that are nearly impossible to find on land, including organic materials such as wood, ropes, and straw mats.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.