The codification of the Jerusalem Talmud at the end of the 4th century CE marked decisively the decline of Jewish life in the Land of Israel, which had begun with the destruction of the Second Temple in the year 70. From the 5th through the 11th centuries, Babylonia would be the demographic, religious, and intellectual center of Jewish life; the Babylonian Talmud (likely completed in the 6th century) would reign supreme; and the g’onim (heads of rabbinic academies) would be held up as religious authorities across the Jewish world. Yet Jewish life continued in what was then the Byzantine province of Palestine, as Tamar Marvin writes:

The Roman administration of the Land of Israel at first recognized officially the nasi, the continuation of the office of the head of the Sanhedrin (Jewish supreme court of 70), which went back to Second Temple times. In the early 5th century, when the “last nasi” Rabban Gamliel VI was accused of abrogating the types of laws [that both protected Jews and maintained their inferior status], recognition and Roman protection of the n’siut, or patriarchate, was withdrawn. The historical record is poor for the next several centuries, . . . but it seems that a yeshiva functioned in Tiberias in northern Israel.

Sometime after that, the title of the person at the yeshiva’s helm settled at ga’on, just like his colleagues in Babylonia, now Iraq. However, the ga’on of the academy of the Land of Israel combined the roles of two separate offices that existed in Babylonia, that of the spiritual leader and exilarch, [or lay leader]. In other words, he was a political representative to the government after the Muslim conquests as well as the leader of the yeshiva.

An additional form of leadership that developed during this early medieval period in Eretz Yisrael was the spiritual leadership of composing poetic prayers (piyyut), many of which remain with us and on our lips to the present day. Written in dense, exceedingly difficult Hebrew dotted with neologisms . . . and drawing upon Midrashic language, piyyut is hauntingly beautiful and tricky to navigate. The later poets of medieval Spain would largely eschew [this style] for what they considered purer and clearer biblical idiom, but the classical poets’ language remains breathtaking and unique.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.