While most of the historic synagogues discovered by archaeologists in Israel have been found in the northern part of the country, a few have been uncovered in the arid south. All Israel News reports on one:

The Ma’on synagogue, first discovered in 1957 on the southern end of Israel, is one of three ancient synagogues discovered so far in the western Negev region. The town of Ma’on is believed to have existed during the late Roman period and in the Byzantine period, during the 5th and 7th centuries CE.

Ma’on, or Manois, was considered to be a large town, mostly inhabited by Christians. While most likely under Byzantine rule at that time, the ancient synagogue is evidence that a Jewish community existed, with the religious center being the most significant expression of its independence.

The synagogue faces northeast, towards Jerusalem, according to Jewish tradition, and was thought to have been built on a basilica plan, with an ancient mosaic floor in the center and two side aisles paved with stone. The ceiling was believed to have been made of wooden beams and clay. The walls of the synagogue are thought to have been built with rectangular stones that were placed on stone foundations. According to inscriptions, a cavalry unit from the western Balkans may also have been stationed in Ma’on for a time.

A magnificent mosaic floor was [also] discovered at the site.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.