The 16th-century code of Jewish law known as the Shulhan Arukh states that on the Sabbath one should not read “profane belles lettres or fables” such as the “book of Immanuel.” Indeed, it adds, one should not read such a book even during the weekdays, since it contains frivolity and divrey ḥeshek, apparently a reference to erotic content.

The proscribed book was the Maḥb’rot Immanuel, or “Compositions of Immanuel,” a collection of Hebrew poetry and rhymed prose by a 14th-century Roman Jew. It includes the earliest known sonnets written in a language other than Italian, and a long poem—clearly modeled on Dante’s Divine Comedy—in which the prophet Daniel gives the author a tour of the afterlife. In addition, Immanuel of Rome wrote biblical commentaries that earned praise from such mainstream figures as the great Jerusalemite rabbi Hayyim Jospeh David Azulay (a/k/a the Hida). Dana Fishkin discusses this remarkable and controversial figure, his biography, and his philosophic and literary agendas with Nachi Weinstein. (Audio 90 minutes.)

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.