A very large portion of the fighting force that the IDF has deployed is made up of reservists, who pursue a host of different careers in their civilian lives. For one such reservist, Lieutenant-Colonel Yair Amitsur, his nonmilitary training proved useful when he and a fellow reserve officer came across a large bowl-shaped item in the staging ground just outside Gaza, which he recognized as an ancient mortar. Judy Siegel-Itzkovich reports:

Amitsur, the commander of the civilian frontline in Division 143, and Major Eliashiv Buhbut discovered the tool made of basalt, which weighs more than ten kilograms. . . . Amitsur, who ordinarily is an IAA archaeologist, immediately recognized that it was an ancient grinding tool.

“Black-colored basalt is familiar from the north of the country as in Tiberias or Safed, or from other remote areas,” Amitsur explained. “It was clear to me that the tool we found was brought here from afar and was probably used in the past in the home of one of the residents of the area to grind grain or other products, which is done with a heavy pestle. We were excited to . . . receive a greeting from the past and engage in some good news. The tool reminds us that throughout the generations, the Western Negev served as a significant settlement area where a variety of cultures settled. There were also wars in the past, but in the end, settlement always returned, and the area again flourished,” he added.

Noah Rothman provides a worthwhile reminder of why a nuclear Iran is a threat not just to Israel, but to the United States:

For one, Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism on earth. It exports terrorists and arms throughout the region and beyond, and there are no guarantees that it won’t play a similarly reckless game with nuclear material. At minimum, the terrorist elements in Iran’s orbit would be emboldened by Iran’s new nuclear might. Their numbers would surely grow, as would their willingness to court risk.

Iran maintains the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region. It can certainly deliver a warhead to targets inside the Middle East, and it’s fast-tracking the development of space-launch vehicles that can threaten the U.S. mainland. Even if Tehran were a rational actor that could be reliably deterred, an acknowledged Iranian bomb would kick-start a race toward nuclear proliferation in the region. The Saudis, the Turks, the Egyptians, and others would probably be compelled to seek their own nuclear deterrents, leading to an infinitely more complex security environment.

In the meantime, Iran would be able to blackmail the West, allowing it occasionally to choke off the trade and energy exports that transit the Persian Gulf and to engage in far more reckless acts of international terrorism.

As for the possible consequences, Rothman observes:

Iranian retaliation might be measured with the understanding that if it’s not properly calibrated, the U.S. and Israel could begin taking out Iranian command-and-control targets next. If the symbols of the regime begin crumbling, the oppressed Iranian people might find the courage to finish the job. If there’s anything the mullahs fear more than the U.S. military, it’s their own citizens.