Contrary to what you might hear from the U.S. government or read in the New York Times, Prime Minister Netanyahu has enforced a “quiet freeze” on settlement construction outside the major settlement blocs and Jerusalem. Nonetheless, write Elliott Abrams and Uri Sadot, the Jewish population in these areas has been growing steadily over the past several years, most likely due to the growth of families already living there. If this trend continues, it will have important policy implications (free registration required):

Even at current population-growth rates, the idea of over 100,000 Israelis living outside the major settlement blocs may render the Clinton parameters for a peace agreement increasingly irrelevant. The idea of evacuating every Israeli living [in such places] will seem increasingly unrealistic. The United States may be forced to move, then, from insisting on their removal to challenging the Palestinian insistence that every single one of them leave. The old idea that Palestine must be totally free of Jews has always been morally offensive; with every passing year it also becomes more and more impractical. It could gradually be replaced with the understanding that a certain number of Jews will remain as resident aliens if a Palestinian state is ever to be established.

With 1.7 million Arabs living as full citizens in Israel, the idea of tens of thousands of Jews living in Palestine should not seem beyond consideration. Security arrangements for Israelis who voluntarily choose to live in a Palestinian state rather than move back to Israel would be immensely complicated, and in many eyes impossible. But the same can be said about any plan that would force tens of thousands of them to leave their homes.

With no Palestinian state likely for the foreseeable future, much more attention should be dedicated to real life on the ground today: Hamas’s activities in Gaza, the performance of the Palestinian Authority and its institutions, the lack of democratic institutions and free elections, current security arrangements, and measures to help the West Bank economy, for example. The sole focus on getting back to the negotiating table is at odds with reality in the Middle East.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.