Recent press reports have documented a massive buildup of Hizballah rockets in the Shiite villages of southern Lebanon in direct contravention of UN Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war. Dore Gold explains the likely consequences:

Hizballah, supplied, trained, and funded by Iran, is building new military strongholds in Lebanese border villages. By doing so, Hizballah has turned Lebanese civilians into human shields—much as Hamas did in the Gaza Strip. . . .

UNIFIL, the UN force in Lebanon, was supposed to oversee the implementation of Resolution 1701. But do you think UNIFIL is going to enter a Shiite village and remove rockets stored in houses?

The UN is thus leaving Israel with a horrible choice if war breaks out again: the IDF will either have to destroy the weapons now being stored in southern Lebanon or let Hizballah fire thousands of rockets into Israel. . . . Under the laws of war, Israel will have every right to destroy a house that has become a legitimate military target. Shouldn’t the UN avert this outcome by taking action now? Don’t hold your breath.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.