Noah Pollak suggests what the U.S. can do to move relations with the Jewish state in a new and better direction after Barack Obama leaves office:

The first thing the next president, Democrat or Republican, might consider doing is downgrading the peace process as the central feature of the U.S.-Israel relationship. . . . The pursuit of Palestinian statehood over the past quarter-century has damaged U.S. credibility. It has committed our country to a diplomatic proceeding whose expectations have always been set too high, and in which corrupt and violent figures are promoted as peace partners while an ally is set up to play the role of scapegoat.

It doesn’t have to be like this. The next president can acknowledge the benefits of a Palestinian state that is truly and permanently at peace with Israel, yet recognize that such a state is unlikely to emerge soon, given Hamas’s control of Gaza and the corruption, sclerosis, and terror-friendliness of the Palestinian Authority (PA). There will be a time, the next president could say, to discuss statehood. Until then, our emphasis should be on encouraging Palestinian reform. A good place to start would be by insisting that the PA stop paying benefits to terrorists and their families, and conditioning further American aid on the cessation of such payments.

Freed from this diplomatic rut, the next president can move to rebuild the alliance on a foundation that serves American interests and strengthens Israel’s security and legitimacy. The broad goal should be a reduction of the kind of ambiguities about Israel’s borders and territory that have created opportunities for mischief-makers around the world to manufacture diplomatic crises.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.