In the past two weeks, Barack Obama has spoken at a Washington, D.C. synagogue, discussed U.S.-Israel relations with a prominent American Jewish journalist, and given an interview on Israeli television. Despite the president’s ostensible goal of demonstrating his commitment to the U.S.-Israel alliance, David M. Weinberg is convinced that the real purpose of his rhetorical offensive is quite different:

Barack Obama’s moralizing appeal to Jewish and Zionist “values” is actually a trick. If you pitch your political views as “values” and your opponents’ position as a breach of values, then your threat of punishment suddenly seems noble. . . .

I don’t know whether the trick will work for the deal with Iran, but it is clear to me that Obama is attempting to soften up domestic opposition to a policy shift whereby the administration will effectively abandon Israel at the United Nations. Obama more than hinted at that in his Israeli television talk. . . .

I say to Rabbi Obama . . . : Spare us your honest exhortations. Enjoy your self-satisfying centrist values, but don’t fool yourself into thinking that you’re doing Israel any favors by declaring the parameters of what [territorial] withdrawals and other Israeli foreign and defense policies “must be.” I say no thanks to your tough love. I encourage you to “confront your [own] values” and re-engage Israeli democracy on a more realistic and respectful basis.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.