At the end of last year’s Gaza war, Hamas and its supporters proudly (if irrationally) declared victory. Now, they are quietly admitting that they lost. Evelyn Gordon tries to ascertain what convinced them:

Throughout the fighting, Hamas promised its people that even though they were suffering, it would be worth it: the international community would rebuild their homes and grant massive development aid; Gaza’s borders with both Israel and Egypt would be opened wide; Gaza would get an airport and seaport. But in reality, none of this has happened.

International aid has largely failed to materialize, and, as one recent poll shows, Gaza residents blame this mainly on Hamas. Reconstruction work has barely begun. The Egyptian border remains tightly sealed. No airport or seaport is on the horizon. Israel’s naval blockade remains in place. Indeed, the only positive change has been a modest easing of restrictions at the land border with Israel. And that simply isn’t enough to justify the devastation the war wreaked on Gaza.

Just how unpopular this has made the prospect of another war is evident from another finding of the poll mentioned above: though a whopping 84 percent of Gazans support “armed struggle” against Israel in principle, an identical proportion—83 percent—want Hamas to maintain a cease-fire with Israel in both Gaza and the West Bank. In the West Bank, where 56 percent support “armed struggle” in principle, 74 percent want Hamas to maintain a cease-fire in both areas.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.