A Norwegian film festival recently rejected an Israeli movie about disabled children in Israel—on the grounds that it is pledged to boycott any Israeli film with a subject other than Israel’s supposed persecution of the Palestinians. The fact that the film received no government sponsorship, or that its director, Roy Zafrani, does not make a habit of pronouncing on political issues, was of no consequence. Jonathan Marks comments on what this reveals about the purposes of the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement:

[The festival’s] actions are fully in the spirit of the BDS campaign against “normalization.” [According to the official BDS program], projects may be subject to boycott if they seek to foster cooperation and understanding between Israelis and Palestinians, unless that cooperation and understanding is founded on the premise that Israel is an apartheid state.

Now, Zafrani’s documentary isn’t about Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, but the logic of “anti-normalization” points directly to rejecting it. If failing to denounce Israel as an apartheid state makes one complicit in Israel’s effort to pass for anything other than a monster, then the claim that Zafrani is apolitical, far from being a defense, is evidence against him. An Israeli artist who devotes himself to anything other than denouncing Israel is guilty and deserves to be shunned.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.