Amos Yadlin and Carmit Valensi argue that although Vladimir Putin’s precise goals in Syria are unclear, he either intends to maintain Bashar al-Assad’s control over all or part of the country or to replace him with someone who will remain loyal to existing alliances with Russia and Iran. None of these outcomes serves Israel’s interests:

If once there was hope that the [Syrian] regime would collapse in the course of events, without Israeli intervention, Russia’s active support for Assad weakens the chances of ousting him. . . . Russian involvement underscores the need to examine the issue at the systemic level rather than at the level of individual actors. The system—the radical axis—includes Iran, Syria, and Hizballah, with Russia, at least for now, seen as [its] sponsor. Hizballah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has stressed the stability of the Assad regime as a condition for the survival of the radical axis. . . .

The members of the radical axis and Russia share intelligence and a systemic rationale, providing a foundation for coordination between the Russian aerial force and Iran-Syria-Hizballah ground forces. If [Assad remains in power], Israel will find itself in an inferior strategic position because Russia’s involvement is liable to provide a seal of approval for Iranian activity in Syria in years to come, as well as for Hizballah forces armed with the best of Russia’s weapons on Syrian soil. . . .

Israel must gear up for active efforts to topple Assad, based on the understanding that, beyond the moral imperative, Assad’s ouster will lead to a strategic loss for Iran and Hizballah in the bleeding Syrian state.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.