The Brave Palestinians Who Welcomed Anwar Sadat on His Visit to Israel

Dec. 31 2015

When, in 1977, the Egyptian president announced his intention to visit Israel, Moshe Dayan gave Menahem Milson—then the head of the Department of Arab Affairs for the military government of Judea and Samaria—a list of prominent Palestinian figures to invite to the arrival ceremony at the airport. As Milson accurately predicted, everyone on the list refused to attend. At Dayan’s behest, Milson then proceeded to invite Palestinian leaders of his own choosing—with significantly greater success. At play in this historical vignette was a fundamental difference in attitudes:

[Dayan frequently exhibited a] distaste for moderate Palestinians. He made it publicly known that he regarded Palestinian terrorism as a “natural” response to [the Palestinian] condition and consequently did not really take Palestinians who openly rejected terrorism seriously—even though it required a great deal of personal courage (and strong backing from one’s clan) to deviate publicly from the official PLO line. . . .

[Sadat’s visit] highlighted the substantial difference between two approaches to relations with the Palestinians: that of Dayan—the man who had determined Israel’s policy in the [occupied] territories since the 1967 war—and the very different approach in which I believed. The principle that guided me in all my work as adviser on Arab affairs, and later as head of the civil administration in the West Bank, was that Israel had to encourage and protect those Palestinians who favored coexistence, whether they were pro-Jordan or proponents of Palestinian independence. . . .

[On the third day of his visit], Sadat met with several of the Palestinian figures who had welcomed him at the airport. . . . Upon his return to Egypt, he declared: “In Jerusalem I met the real Palestinians.” It was, ironically, precisely the reverse of Moshe Dayan’s position.

Of course, this is all something like ancient history in Israeli-Palestinian relations by now. Over the last three-plus decades, we have seen the Oslo Accords and recurrent rounds of negotiations that have led nowhere. All the more reason, then, to recall those brave Palestinians who 38 years ago defied the PLO and welcomed Sadat at Ben-Gurion Airport.

Read more at Jewish Review of Books

More about: Anwar Sadat, Israel & Zionism, Moshe Dayan, Palestinians, PLO, West Bank

Egypt Is Trapped by the Gaza Dilemma It Helped to Create

Feb. 14 2025

Recent satellite imagery has shown a buildup of Egyptian tanks near the Israeli border, in violation of Egypt-Israel agreements going back to the 1970s. It’s possible Cairo wants to prevent Palestinians from entering the Sinai from Gaza, or perhaps it wants to send a message to the U.S. that it will take all measures necessary to keep that from happening. But there is also a chance, however small, that it could be preparing for something more dangerous. David Wurmser examines President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s predicament:

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and materiel to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability.

Now that the Trump administration is threatening to remove the population of Gaza, President Sisi is reaping the consequences of a problem he and his predecessors helped to sow. That, writes Wurmser, leaves him with a dilemma:

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts Trump’s plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or nakba. It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first nakba in 1948. Any leader who fails to stop a second nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. President Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

In a worst-case scenario, Wurmser argues, Sisi might decide that he’d rather fight a disastrous war with Israel and blow up his relationship with Washington than display that kind of weakness.

Read more at The Editors

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023