In 1995, an operative of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) drove a van filled with explosives into an Israeli bus, killing the American college student Alisa Flatow along with seven Israelis, and wounding dozens more. With the help of the attorneys Steven Perles and Thomas Fay, Flatow’s father Stephen sued Iran, the main sponsor of PIJ, initiating a legal battle that went on for over a decade. Convincing a U.S. court to award damages proved relatively easy, but convincing the Clinton administration to pay the damages out of Iranian assets proved nearly impossible. M. R. O’Connor tells the story of the case, and the eventual victory:

Perles and Fay . . . knew that within a few miles of their own offices were three pieces of real estate that no one could deny were Iranian: the embassy chancery of Iran, the residence of the minister of cultural affairs of the embassy of Iran, and the residency of the military attaché of the embassy of Iran. All three had been seized by the State Department on April 7, 1980. . . .

Stephen Flatow’s legal team filed a writ of attachment—a court order to seize an asset—for the properties on July 8, 1998. The next day, at a hearing, . . . they were astounded to see over a dozen government lawyers. The government wanted [the court] to deny the writ. . . .

Perles watched as Flatow’s head sank. He had brought the Iranians to court with the belief that he had the powerful will of President Clinton behind him. Instead it seemed he had now gained a formidable foe, one who was prepared to fight him with all the resources available to his administration. . . .

Some time later, the legal team received a tip from the State Department about an FBI investigation into the Alavi Foundation, a private charity that served as an Iranian front organization; perhaps damages could be awarded from its assets:

Perles and Fay sent a request to the Justice Department: would the government support their arguments about the Alavi Foundation in court? They never got a response.

Flatow saw the silence as a double-cross: they had been led to the Alavi Foundation by the government, which then refused to go the next step and give them proof that would win the case. The proceedings revealed how cautiously the administration was protecting its relations with Iran.

It was not until 2000, after multiple interventions by Congress, that Perles and Fay were able to obtain a settlement for their client.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.