Ban Ki-moon Sticks to His Anti-Israel Guns

After drawing criticism for his justification of Palestinian terror last week, the UN secretary-general defended himself in an op-ed in the New York Times entitled “Don’t Shoot the Messenger.” In it he stated that “nothing excuses terrorism”—and then went on to blame Israel for the series of murderous attacks on its citizens and for the failure to reach a two-state solution. Ruthie Blum writes:

Given the total falsehood of [Ban’s] depiction of the situation—for example, by omitting Israel’s ‎withdrawal from more than 90 percent of the territory it obtained after the attempt of surrounding ‎Arab armies to obliterate it in the Six-Day War—it is no wonder that his proposed solutions to ‎the problem are so preposterous.‎ . . .

‎”Of course,” Ban [wrote], “a lasting agreement between Israel and Palestine will require ‎difficult compromises by leaders and peoples on both sides.”‎

Indeed, Israel has made endless “difficult compromises,” for decades. This has led to repeated ‎uprisings against the Israeli populace, such as the current spate of terrorism that surged in ‎September, thanks in large measure to incitement emanating from official PA institutions and ‎media outlets.‎ . . .

More ridiculous than his [arguments], though, is the title of the piece, taken from ‎his claim that Israel’s ire [over his previous remarks] is a form of “shooting the messenger.” It is a metaphor he clearly does ‎not know how to use properly, since he is a key source of the anti-Israel message—embraced by ‎anti-Semites the world over—not some serf paid to deliver it.‎

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Ban Ki-Moon, Israel & Zionism, New York Times, Palestinian terror, Two-State Solution, United Nations

 

To Save Gaza, the U.S. Needs a Strategy to Restrain Iran

Since the outbreak of war on October 7, America has given Israel much support, and also much advice. Seth Cropsey argues that some of that advice hasn’t been especially good:

American demands for “restraint” and a “lighter footprint” provide significant elements of Hamas’s command structure, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 10/7, a far greater chance of surviving and preserving the organization’s capabilities. Its threat will persist to some extent in any case, since it has significant assets in Lebanon and is poised to enter into a full-fledged partnership with Hizballah that would give it access to Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps for recruitment and to Iranian-supported ratlines into Jordan and Syria.

Turning to the aftermath of the war, Cropsey observes that it will take a different kind of involvement for the U.S. to get the outcomes it desires, namely an alternative to Israeli and to Hamas rule in Gaza that comes with buy-in from its Arab allies:

The only way that Gaza can be governed in a sustainable and stable manner is through the participation of Arab states, and in particular the Gulf Arabs, and the only power that can deliver their participation is the United States. A grand bargain is impossible unless the U.S. exerts enough leverage to induce one.

Militarily speaking, the U.S. has shown no desire seriously to curb Iranian power. It has persistently signaled a desire to avoid escalation. . . . The Gulf Arabs understand this. They have no desire to engage in serious strategic dialogue with Washington and Jerusalem over Iran strategy, since Washington does not have an Iran strategy.

Gaza’s fate is a small part of a much broader strategic struggle. Unless this is recognized, any diplomatic master plan will degenerate into a diplomatic parlor game.

Read more at National Review

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy