The Palestinian Authority (PA) is governed by a president, Mahmoud Abbas, who is now in the twelfth year of a five-year term, who routinely uses torture and arbitrary arrests to enforce his rule, and who vigorously represses freedom of speech and assembly. In an extensive survey of the situation, the veteran Palestinian human-rights activist Bassem Eid argues that peace between Israelis and Palestinians is impossible as long as the latter live under tyranny:

In considering the critical issues that are preventing progress in moving toward reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, there has often been a failure to account fully for the detrimental role played by the PA in abusing human rights and civil liberties. The oppressive policies of the PA have undoubtedly contributed to the alienation of large parts of the Palestinian public, and pushed some further toward extremist groups such as Hamas. These abuses . . . have hardened attitudes against the process of negotiations with Israel. . . . As the PA becomes increasingly tarnished in the eyes of the Palestinian public, so too will the peace process . . . come to be seen in an ever-worse light.

In addition to the damaging effect that PA oppression is having on the attitudes of the Palestinian population, the lack of legitimate and responsible governance on the Palestinian side is likely to undermine Israeli confidence in the negotiation process and discourage further concessions from Israel. The strategic thinking currently prevalent in Israel heavily emphasizes the concern that a lawless and unstable Palestinian state could emerge on territory adjacent to Israel’s population centers and [thus] evolve into an existential security threat. Israel is particularly concerned that a weak, oppressive, and undemocratic Palestinian government would be susceptible of being overthrown, with the likelihood that this would then lead to the territory coming under the control of extremist elements such as Hamas. . . .

Despite [the PA’s severe abuse of the rights of its citizens], its leadership has continued to be championed on the world stage as moderate and as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians at the negotiating table . . . [and] to be rewarded by the international community. This has included not only substantial financial assistance from the United States and the European Union, but also ever-greater levels of recognition by international bodies such as at the United Nations. . . .

Both the use of diplomatic pressure and the threat to withhold financial assistance should be considered by policymakers as a way to incentivize the PA to engage seriously with addressing human-rights issues and complying with its obligations under international law.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.