Hizballah currently has over 130,000 missiles, rockets, and mortars pointed at Israel—more than can be found in the combined arsenals of all NATO countries except the U.S. These include hundreds of large-payload, long-range rockets that could destroy large buildings or even entire neighborhoods, as well as thousands of smaller lethal projectiles that are too small to be intercepted by Israel’s missile-defense systems. Speaking with a number of high-ranking Israeli officers and security experts, Willy Stern finds that most believe a war with Hizballah is inevitable. In the words of one of his interviewees, “it is going to be an absolute sh—storm. And [Israel is] going to be blamed.”

Hizballah cleverly places its arsenal where any Israeli military response—even legal, carefully planned, narrowly targeted, proportionate measures—will lead to massive civilian casualties among Lebanese. Why? Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah’s cunning leader, sees a win-win situation. He’d like nothing better than for the IDF to kill Lebanese civilians. When these awful images appear on CNN and the front pages of the New York Times, Nasrallah will paint the IDF as baby-killers and worse. . . .

Israel wants the world to know that (1) a war with Hizballah in Lebanon will be, unavoidably, awful; and (2) the massive collateral damage won’t be Israel’s fault. Even more than that, the IDF seems to be pleading to the international community: do something. Stop Hizballah. Before it is too late, and they drag the region into a bloody hellhole. . . .

[Still], given Israel’s sophisticated, high-tech war-fighting machine, Amos Yadlin, [a retired major general and former head of military intelligence], says the IDF will have “clear superiority” in any conflict with Hizballah. Deterrence matters. Yadlin and every IDF officer I spoke to made one point clear: a war with Hizballah may be ugly, but Israel will win. Decisively.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.