Over the past five years, Israel has carefully limited its role in the bloody civil war raging across its northern border. Amos Yadlin argues that now is the time to take a more active approach to ensuring the fall of Bashar al-Assad, a long-time enemy who has slaughtered hundreds of thousands of his own people. Without becoming a full-fledged participant in the war, Yadlin argues, Israel should use the diplomatic and military means at its disposal to advance the goal of defeating Assad:

In addition to the moral [imperative], which in its own right provides sufficient justification for Assad’s ouster, the fall of [his] regime is a strategic Israeli interest. The radical axis led by Iran that runs through Assad-controlled Syria to Hizballah in Lebanon, and embraces the strategic goal of putting an end to Israel, is the most concrete threat the state of Israel faces today. The axis’s current military capabilities, and the additional capabilities it can be expected to acquire, constitute the industrial and scientific resources of a regional power. Its recent strengthening vis-à-vis its rivals in Syria has made it clear that action must be taken to prevent this problematic strategic development, preferably in coordination with major countries in the region and the global superpowers.

Some argue that the threat posed by Islamic State is no less serious and must be dealt with first—and indeed, the severity of the Islamic State threat, which has been debated in Israel over the past two years, must not be underestimated. However, contending with this issue should not prevent Israel from assigning a clear strategic preference to the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut challenge. . . .

[A]lthough Islamic State attracts some Sunnis in Syria while Assad remains in power, it is extremely likely that an end to his rule and the evolution of a moderate Sunni alternative will greatly weaken Islamic State’s appeal. Moreover, recent reports confirm suspicions regarding cooperation between the Assad regime and Islamic State and bolster the assumption that these two extremist parties share a common interest in weakening and eliminating any moderate alternative and helping safeguard the survival of one another. Israel, on the other hand, remains virtually alone against the pro-Iranian radical axis and can rely on no one but itself.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.