Ten years after the second Lebanon war, there remains a widespread perception in Israel that it was a failure—a perception bolstered both by Hizballah leaders’ subsequent declarations of victory and by the Knesset’s Winograd commission, which found numerous failings on the part of both the IDF and the Olmert government. However, argues Yaakov Amidror, the war was in many ways a success:

This notorious campaign . . . has given Israel unprecedented calm on the northern border. [But] the media . . . evaluated the campaign’s success according to its own expectations rather than according to the campaign’s effect on the enemy. . . .

As it turns out, the Israel Defense Forces inflicted massive damage on Hizballah. [Its leader, Sheikh Hassan] Nasrallah, found himself in a highly precarious situation in which his men were a hair’s breadth from their breaking point. . . .

[Israelis’] criticism of the military was justified, but as Nasrallah learned the hard way, the IDF has the upper hand in any clash with Hizballah. Nasrallah understood he was on the verge of a crushing defeat, one he could not spin into a “divine victory.” The crippling blows Hizballah suffered, particularly at the hands of the Israel Air Force, also explain why the Shiite terrorist group has been focusing considerable effort on building up its air defenses.

The second reason for the misperception is that Israeli pundits failed to account for Iranian interests. Iran formed Hizballah as its regional proxy, a long strategic arm to be used to generate deterrence and retaliate for major events. And there the group was, wasting its resources on a minor move like the abduction of two Israeli soldiers, for which it was made to pay dearly. Already anxious about its strategic asset, Iran responded to Hizballah’s gambit by deciding it needed to supervise the group far more strictly. . . . So, following the 2006 campaign, Iran imposed restrictions on Hizballah’s aggression.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.