Although there may be some short-term disruption in trade with Israel due to Great Britain’s decision to leave the EU, and the Jewish state will lose an important ally within the European Union, James Sorene believes there may also be long-term benefits:

The UK is Israel’s second-largest trading partner; bilateral trade is worth £5 billion a year and has doubled in the last decade. . . . Britain will need to negotiate a separate trade agreement with Israel as Israel’s association agreement with the EU will no longer apply. If the UK falls into recession, bilateral trade could decrease in value as UK consumers spend less money. But there could be enhanced terms for some Israeli exports, especially agricultural produce, to the UK market once it leaves the EU.

The impact of Brexit on the EU’s policy toward Israel is debatable. In the past, the UK has [sometimes] been an important moderating voice, but often falls in line with common EU positions. The UK will no longer be present for these debates, so Israel will look to other allies in the EU such as Germany. While the UK was a very significant player in EU foreign policy, Israel has been building up relations with several countries in Eastern Europe and most recently became significantly closer to Greece and Cyprus.

In the longer term, the UK’s foreign policy could rebalance away from Europe and gravitate more to U.S. positions. Britain may feel the need to rebut any suggestion of diminished influence by taking more of a lead on the global stage. The UK has a very large foreign-aid budget and the best armed forces in Europe. It has committed significant resources to the fight against Islamic State and shares common strategic interests with Israel. None of this work is connected to EU membership, but is a function of the UK’s military and intelligence capability and its existing alliances in the Middle East.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.