Last November, in response to an ongoing wave of attacks, the Israeli defense ministry announced that it was considering deporting terrorists, possibly along with their families, from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. Is this an effective deterrent? Contrasting the example of the 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives whom Israel expelled to Lebanon in 1992 with other cases, Adam Hoffman suggests that the evidence is mixed:

Israel deported [these] activists from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in trucks to southern Lebanon, but Lebanon refused to accept them into its territory. As a result, they settled in a tent camp in Marj al-Zohour, [which] was controlled by Hizballah. The Shiite organization welcomed the deportees with open arms and [saw] an opportunity to forge connections with the Palestinian terrorist organizations. . . .

Hizballah trained the deportees, supplied them with food and equipment, taught them new fighting tactics, and upgraded their terrorism capabilities. It also taught [them] how to make the explosives and car bombs needed for suicide attacks—a terrorist tactic that was hitherto unique to Hizballah among Middle East terrorist organizations but that became a strategic weapon for Hamas after the Oslo Accords were signed. . . .

Before the deportation to Lebanon, Hamas, [as a Sunni organization], was averse to connections with Shiite Iran. However, according to Sakr Abu Fakher, a Lebanese researcher specializing in Palestinian politics, . . . the “psychological taboo against Shiism was broken in Marj al-Zohour, where the Palestinians came into close contact with Hizballah.” . . .

Despite the negative effects of deportation in these two cases, however, not every act of deportation necessarily leads to ideological extremism or to the improvement of terrorist capabilities among those deported. For example, most of the members of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade who barricaded themselves in the Church of the Nativity in 2002 and were deported to European countries and the Gaza Strip did not return to terrorist activity. . . . It appears that the effect of the deportation of terrorists depends mainly on the nature of the regime and the degree of governance in the country to which the terrorists are expelled.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.