Nearly 500 years ago, Martin Luther called for the burning of synagogues and the destruction of Jewish homes. In 1994, the leaders of the American Lutheran church, along with the global organization, formally rejected and condemned the anti-Semitism of their denominations’ founder. Now, however, the church’s current leaders are seeking to reverse that decision. The triennial assembly of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA), the official U.S. Lutheran organization, recently voted in favor of resolutions calling for divestment from Israel and for the U.S. government to end aid to the Jewish state, recognize a Palestinian state, and pressure Jerusalem to stop the building of “settlements.” Petra Heldt explains how the anti-Israel movement hijacked the church:

Both resolutions, de facto, intend the destruction of the state of Israel. The anti-Israel character of the resolutions fits the old-style Lutheran anti-Semitic diatribes. . . .

The strategy was simple: Isaiah 58 [a U.S.-based anti-Israel Lutheran group] and the network of the current head of the Lutheran World Federation (Munib Younan, [a Palestinian]) teamed up for the preparations of the anti-Israel resolutions. The organized lobbying work [at the conference] produced the desired results. To make sure that no mishap occurred, . . . Pastor Khader Khalila from Bethlehem addressed the ELCA assembly on the alleged Israeli occupation of Bethlehem (which of course has been controlled by the Palestinian Authority since 1993). It worked like clockwork. There was no recognizable group of Lutheran Christians that was able to defend its own turf against such anti-Semitic usurpers. . . .

While politicians might be able to afford to ignore old-fashioned and outdated resolutions on Israel and continue with their business as usual, the good leadership of the Lutheran churches worldwide should not.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.