Next year, the “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) between Jerusalem and Washington, signed in 2007, will expire. Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama are currently negotiating a new memorandum that, like its predecessor, will be concerned primarily with U.S. financial support for the Israeli military, and should run for the next ten years. Although in dollar terms the new agreement proposed by Washington is more generous than the one it replaces, Shoshana Bryen argues that it comes with conditions that make it far less helpful:

[All] of the money [offered in the proposed MOU must] be spent in the U.S., while Israel is presently able to spend 25 percent [domestically].

This is a subsidy for U.S. defense industries and constrains Israel’s defense choices by forcing the IDF to exclude weapons from Europe and elsewhere [and leaves it with less to spend on locally manufactured equipment]. While some think of Israel as an expense to the U.S., the fact is that [its technological] innovations—shared with Washington by agreement—have helped mitigate the decline in the American missile-defense budget in an era of growing threats. Without the ability to spend some money in Israel, it will be harder for smaller defense and high-tech industries to keep up. . . .

Israel will [also] be prohibited from asking Congress for additional funds, effectively removing a bipartisan [source] of support for Israel’s security from the equation and reducing Israel’s flexibility in addressing rapidly emerging threats. . . .

[The Jewish state currently] finds itself in a vastly improved international situation even as its neighborhood declines. It would have been in the larger interest of the United States to enhance [its defensive] capabilities rather than trying to constrain them.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.