In the 2014 Gaza war, Hamas managed to dig tunnels allowing it to attack Israeli communities from its own territory and now seems to be investing substantial effort in creating a new network of tunnels in preparation for the next war. In response, Israel’s defense ministry has announced plans to build an expensive subterranean wall around Gaza. Efraim Inbar argues that is an overreaction:

Acts of terrorism have always been considered by [Israel’s] national-security establishment as secondary to dangers that affect Israel’s territorial integrity or threaten its very existence. The tunnels cannot threaten strategic targets within Israel, such as power stations or airports, as Hamas missiles have done in the past. Investing in defense against missiles is important; spending money to negate the effects of tunnels is much less so. Limited resources dictate that spending be prioritized in accordance with the relative magnitude of the threats to be faced. . . .

The high priority allocated by Israel to the problem of the tunnels is totally unjustified. First, it is not clear that the planned Gaza wall would be effective in preventing Hamas underground projects. Concrete walls can be penetrated, as bank robbers have shown. Israel should not underestimate the ingenuity of the engineers employed by Hamas.

Second, this ambitious project diverts resources from financing more important needs of the IDF. One very pertinent example is the neglect of ground forces due to financial considerations. Beefing up ground forces is an imperative in dealing with the looming threats of accurate missiles and a number of other serious contingencies.

Third, the tremendous effort to handle the tunnel threat unnecessarily magnifies the power of the enemy to harm Israel. . . . Above all, it makes no strategic sense.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.