Created in 2002 to advance the “peace process” laid out in the Oslo Accords, the Quartet—consisting of the EU, the UN, Russia, and the U.S.—has long outlived its usefulness, writes A.J. Caschetta. The principles on which Oslo was based have long since proved untenable. What’s more, the Quartet has lost whatever moral authority it once had:

[E]ach of the four Quartet members is unqualified to negotiate an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Half of the Quartet (the EU and the UN) has elected to champion the Palestinian cause and vilify Israel, and the other half has at least temporarily abdicated the moral ground necessary for the task. The time has come to disband the Quartet.

[As for Russia], the nation that in the past decade has invaded Ukraine and Georgia, and annexed Crimea, has no moral standing in negotiations over which territories will make up a Palestinian state. Historically, the USSR supported Palestinian terrorism. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas earned his PhD in Holocaust denial at a Soviet university. And Russia is [now] an avowed ally of Israel’s enemies—Iran and Syria.

[The] U.S. once upon a time . . . could be relied upon to defend Israel from attacks at the UN, but not under the current president. Barack Obama feigned outrage over Russian interference in the U.S. election, but did little to conceal his interference in the Israeli election, sending his own campaign professionals and spending American taxpayer funds in an attempt to ensure the defeat of Benjamin Netanyahu. . . .

The only redeeming value of the Quartet (and the real miracle of the past eight years) is that Obama didn’t turn it into a quintet by installing Iran as the fifth member.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.