Yesterday the Israeli government announced the appointment of a new ambassador to Turkey, one of the final steps in implementing the reconciliation agreement the two countries reached in June. Yet whether Jerusalem and Ankara will be able to maintain their resurrected alliance depends on the latter’s involvement in the intricacies of internal Palestinian politics, which are themselves connected to the equally intricate web of Middle Eastern rivalries. Pinhas Inbari writes:

The [attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July] shed new light on Turkish-Palestinian relations. Fatah and Hamas expressed common support for Erdogan, while Palestinian leftist organizations linked to the Assad regime did not. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which favor Iran [and its Syrian ally], issued statements criticizing the Israeli-Turkish agreement, [as did] Fatah’s representative in Lebanon. . . .

Although Turkey and Iran are the two regional powers with the greatest influence on Hamas, instead of coordinating their influence, they fight over it. The struggle between Turkey and Iran has also divided Hamas between Turkey-supporters and Iran-supporters, with the pro-Turkish leadership linked to the West Bank and the pro-Iranian leadership situated in Gaza and Lebanon. . . .

The Hamas official most identified with Turkey is [the current politburo chief] Khaled Mashal. . . . Turkey’s support for Mashal has come to the fore in the initiation and planning of West Bank terror attacks. Mashal’s right-hand man Saleh al-Aruri . . . has been the guiding hand of the attacks. . . . Israel insisted that Turkey close the Hamas offices in its borders and expel Aruri and his associates. It is not clear whether this has really happened. New reports suggest that the office still exists. . . .

The real difficulty likely to arise between Turkey and Israel, however, concerns east Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. Turkey has ties with the most extreme elements, such as the former mufti Akrama Sabri, inciter Raed Salah, and Hamas. If it decides to protect them against Israel [in order] to assume leadership of the “al-Aqsa is in danger” campaign, thereby promoting its status as a regional Islamic power, Israel will find itself facing a problem.

Thus, the future of Israeli-Turkish relations depends on the question: will the reconciliation with Israel, along with the lessons of the failed rebellion against him, lead Erdogan to be less “Islamic” and more “Turkish?” In other words, will he prefer Turkey’s interests as a state to those of the Muslim Brotherhood?

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.