Last week, Israel conducted airstrikes against Islamic State (IS)-affiliated forces in southern Syria, in response to their prior attack on an Israeli reconnaissance unit in the Golan. Two days later, Israeli planes reportedly flew into Lebanese airspace and fired missiles at Hizballah positions outside of Damascus, most likely targeting a weapons convoy, and perhaps also at a facility belonging to the Syrian military. Jonathan Spyer explains the two incidents:

[The IS affiliate that attacked Israel] controls an area of the [Israel-Syria] border east of the Golan Heights, [from which it] is conducting a war against the Syrian rebels to its north. It does not fight the forces of the Syrian government because they are not deployed in its immediate vicinity. . . . The volume of the Israeli response was clearly intended to reestablish deterrence against the Sunni jihadists, with the hope that it will cause them to think again before engaging with Israeli forces. . . .

Israel’s main concern, [however], is the Iran-Assad-Hizballah alliance. The reported strikes in the Damascus area, if they took place, were the latest incidents in a limited Israeli campaign against these elements intended to produce two outcomes: first, to limit the transfer of complex weapons systems to Hizballah, and second, to keep the Iran-supported militia and its allies from replacing the rebels along the borderline. . . .

[If Bashar al-Assad and his allies succeed in regaining control over the northern part of Syria], then eventually the southern front will come back onto the agenda. . . . It is Russian air power that is enabling the regime to advance in the north. If employed in the south, it can be expected to eventually produce similar results. . . . [Moscow’s] decision as to whether to allow Assad to reconquer the southwest of his country—and by so doing to allow Iran and Hizballah to reach the border with Israel—will be decisive.

Of course, even in the worst-case scenario in which they decide to allow this, the task facing Israel on the border will not fundamentally change. It will mean that instead of needing to deter hostile but relatively weak Sunni jihadist forces from contemplating action against the hated Zionists, Israel will need to deter hostile and less weak Shiite jihadists with the same intentions. . . . Israel, naturally, prefers the weaker, non-state enemy in close proximity to the stronger. The events of this week show that it is engaged in a tacit, ongoing, unstated, and limited war against both.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.