Last week, Israel conducted airstrikes against Islamic State (IS)-affiliated forces in southern Syria, in response to their prior attack on an Israeli reconnaissance unit in the Golan. Two days later, Israeli planes reportedly flew into Lebanese airspace and fired missiles at Hizballah positions outside of Damascus, most likely targeting a weapons convoy, and perhaps also at a facility belonging to the Syrian military. Jonathan Spyer explains the two incidents:

[The IS affiliate that attacked Israel] controls an area of the [Israel-Syria] border east of the Golan Heights, [from which it] is conducting a war against the Syrian rebels to its north. It does not fight the forces of the Syrian government because they are not deployed in its immediate vicinity. . . . The volume of the Israeli response was clearly intended to reestablish deterrence against the Sunni jihadists, with the hope that it will cause them to think again before engaging with Israeli forces. . . .

Israel’s main concern, [however], is the Iran-Assad-Hizballah alliance. The reported strikes in the Damascus area, if they took place, were the latest incidents in a limited Israeli campaign against these elements intended to produce two outcomes: first, to limit the transfer of complex weapons systems to Hizballah, and second, to keep the Iran-supported militia and its allies from replacing the rebels along the borderline. . . .

[If Bashar al-Assad and his allies succeed in regaining control over the northern part of Syria], then eventually the southern front will come back onto the agenda. . . . It is Russian air power that is enabling the regime to advance in the north. If employed in the south, it can be expected to eventually produce similar results. . . . [Moscow’s] decision as to whether to allow Assad to reconquer the southwest of his country—and by so doing to allow Iran and Hizballah to reach the border with Israel—will be decisive.

Of course, even in the worst-case scenario in which they decide to allow this, the task facing Israel on the border will not fundamentally change. It will mean that instead of needing to deter hostile but relatively weak Sunni jihadist forces from contemplating action against the hated Zionists, Israel will need to deter hostile and less weak Shiite jihadists with the same intentions. . . . Israel, naturally, prefers the weaker, non-state enemy in close proximity to the stronger. The events of this week show that it is engaged in a tacit, ongoing, unstated, and limited war against both.

In October, a young Mauritanian national murdered an Orthodox Jewish man on his way to synagogue in Chicago. This alone should be sufficient sign of the rising dangers of anti-Semitism. Nathan Diament explains how the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act (AAA) can, if passed, make American Jews safer:

We were off to a promising start when the AAA sailed through the House of Representatives in the spring by a generous vote of 320 to 91, and 30 senators from both sides of the aisle jumped to sponsor the Senate version. Then the bill ground to a halt.

Fearful of antagonizing their left-wing activist base and putting vulnerable senators on the record, especially right before the November election, Democrats delayed bringing the AAA to the Senate floor for a vote. Now, the election is over, but the political games continue.

You can’t combat anti-Semitism if you can’t—or won’t—define it. Modern anti-Semites hide their hate behind virulent anti-Zionism. . . . The Anti-Semitism Awareness Act targets this loophole by codifying that the Department of Education must use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition of anti-Semitism in its application of Title VI.