This past weekend, diplomats descended on Paris with the ostensible goal of hammering out a proposal that would get Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table. What transpired, writes Eran Lerman, was not only an “exercise in diplomatic futility” but an obstacle to any successful resolution of the conflict:

The French didn’t manage to bring the Israelis to Paris and, to add to the absurdity, even the Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, who had endorsed the effort, was a no-show, [although he spent the day at a nearby hotel]. Mainstream Palestinian factions not aligned with Abbas’s West Bank government criticized the conference and, no matter how well-intentioned he may be, the French foreign minister Jean-Marc Ayrault will not get Hamas in Gaza to abandon its firm ideological commitment to violence or its total rejection of the peace process itself.

For decades, Palestinian hopes have been pinned on an imposed solution. The Paris conference certainly did not give them that—it did not have the clout to do so. However, the danger lies in the possibility that momentum from the conference will be harnessed toward convincing the international community to rewrite the terms of reference for future negotiations—and therein lies the peril. Once the conference hosts and their partners recognize their inability to get Hamas to accept the peace process, they will have no choice but to ignore their realization that before peace can even be possible, a top priority is “reuniting Palestinians under a single, democratic and legitimate Palestinian authority.” . . .

A sober look at the realities—as embodied, for example, in President Bush’s letter to Ariel Sharon on April 14, 2004—would indicate that an implementable agreement must reflect some basic facts on the ground. To encourage the Palestinians to believe that much more can be achieved by means of international pressure—like pushing Israel back to indefensible lines, or carving up the living city of Jerusalem (which, following the recent terror attack there, would look like a reward for terrorism)—is to harm their long-term interests by selling them on a fantasy.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.