After hosting both Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas at the White House, the president now seems to be serious about restarting the peace process. But, argues Lee Smith, while President Trump—author of the Art of the Deal—prides himself on his ability as a negotiator, his skill won’t help here.

[I]n Trump’s view, and in the view of a generation of Middle East experts in Washington, the peace process is, in fact, nothing more than a real-estate deal waiting to happen—with all the architectural designs filed and more or less approved a long time ago. As all the Washington experts say—everyone knows what a final deal will look like. The Palestinians get this chunk of real estate and the Israelis hold on to that chunk, with the requisite amount of horse-trading, complaints, and threats in-between. Donald Trump has certainly been there before.

Which should give President Trump pause. Seen through the eyes of a real-estate developer, the problem with “the biggest deal there is” should be obvious: Mahmoud Abbas, and the cause he represents, is history’s most stubborn holdout. Everyone in the real-estate business knows what a holdout is—it’s the [troublesome] widow or small business owner or local lawyer who stubbornly, unreasonably refuses to sell his or her tiny lot, no matter what price the developer offers. . . .

It’s hard not to admire the holdouts—stubborn, proud people who feel they’ve swallowed enough garbage their whole lives, and when they get a chance to stick it to “the man,” they’re not going to fold. . . . [But] the holdouts are fools. You certainly wouldn’t want them handling your life savings. Sure, there is more to life than money, but stubbornness for the sake of a small footnote in real-estate lore doesn’t put food on the table—or provide for the next generation. . . .

It’s true that Abbas knows his time is just about up, and he wants his legacy carved in stone. But that legacy is not a peace deal, and it’s not even rejecting a peace deal quietly as he did when he turned down [the former Israeli prime minister Ehud] Olmert. No, this is Abbas’s moment in the spotlight—and he’s going to make the American president who wants to make the big deal beg him to sell and sign before he tells him to take a hike.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.