The U.S. and Russia implemented a cease-fire in a limited area of southern Syria last month; the two countries are reportedly in talks about how to de-escalate the conflict elsewhere. According to Yossi Kuperwasser, the agreement “tacitly gave legitimacy to the prolonged presence of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces” in much of Syria. Israel is concerned that further agreements will do the same—and that Tehran will begin using Syria as a conduit for sending arms, supplies, and troops to Hizballah. Kuperwasser points out other, even more troubling, consequences:

Iran almost assuredly wants to turn Syria into an Iranian military base. It plans to build a naval base [on the coast], and may move ground forces, missiles, and maybe even aircraft there as well so that instead of threatening Israel from 1,300 kilometers away, Iranian forces could sit on Israel’s doorstep. This would bring about a dramatic change in the nature of the threat Israel is facing. In fact, Israel’s neighbor to the north would no longer be Syria but Iran, using a Syrian façade with impunity. . . .

The Iranians may [also] take advantage of their continuous presence in Syria . . . to make progress on Syrian territory in their nuclear program. Under the 2015 nuclear deal, the International Atomic Energy Agency can monitor nuclear activities in Iran, but has no authority to monitor Iranian activity abroad. . . . Iran may use [such] loopholes to conduct research and development of nuclear-related material in Syria.

As a reminder: ten years ago, Syria nearly completed a secret nuclear facility in Deir Ez-Zor with Iranian and North Korean assistance. The facility was destroyed [by Israel] in September 2007.

The Russian interest in this negotiated deal reflects the Russian commitment to keep Bashar al-Assad as president of Syria and to secure the ongoing presence of Russian military bases in Syria. Russia regards Iran as an irreplaceable protector of Assad. Putin is also motivated by the Russian interest in weakening radical Sunni forces that constitute the most effective elements of the opposition to Assad. . . . A continuous Iranian presence in Syria is a strategic interest for Moscow.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.