The Spanish region of Catalonia declared its independence last month, after its citizens overwhelmingly voted to do so. In response, Madrid dissolved the regional government, imposed direct rule, and issued an arrest warrant for the former Catalonian president. Jeff Jacoby comments:

In the ensuing [post-referendum] violence, voters were beaten with clubs, dragged by their hair, and shot with rubber bullets [by Spanish police]. Nearly 900 civilians were treated for injuries. . . . A senior cabinet minister warned [subsequently] that Spain will use force, if necessary, to compel Catalonia to submit. . . .

[Nonetheless], the Spanish government unhesitatingly proclaims support for Palestinian sovereignty. . . . How can Spain, so ready to endorse a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians, aggressively oppose one for its conflict with Catalonia?

The phenomenon isn’t limited to Spain. Iraq also backs statehood and full UN membership for the Palestinians—but not for the Iraqi Kurds who decisively voted for independence last month. . . . As recently as July, the Chinese president Xi Jinping hosted Mahmoud Abbas in Beijing and endorsed a “settlement of the Palestinian issue on the basis of the two-state solution.” But under no circumstances will China contemplate a “two-state solution” for Tibetans, an ancient people with a unique linguistic, cultural, and religious identity. . . .

Only when it comes to Palestinians is the international community obsessed with a “two-state solution.” That isn’t because Palestinians are uniquely qualified for sovereignty. The dysfunctional, violent, and corrupt Palestinian Authority is about as ill-suited to statehood as any entity can be. Rather, the unending agitation to create a Palestinian state is a reflection of the world’s restless preoccupation with Jews—and, since 1948, with the Jewish state.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.