Despite repeated protestations from Washington, the Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to pay generous salaries to perpetrators of terrorist attacks and stipends to the families of those killed while carrying them out. Much of that money ultimately comes from the EU and the U.S., which provide the PA with a large portion of its annual budget. Daniel Schwammenthal comments:

Last year, the Mideast Quartet, composed of the EU, the U.S., the UN, and Russia, for the first time clearly stated that Palestinian terror and incitement “are fundamentally incompatible with a peaceful resolution.” . . . In the U.S., the Taylor Force Act, which is making its way through Congress with strong bipartisan support, would extract a steep economic price from the PA if it continued subsidizing terror. What can the EU do?

To be sure, [neither the West, the Palestinians, nor Israel] would gain from the financial collapse of the PA. Nevertheless, public EU criticism of the PA could well trigger a change of policy. If that doesn’t work, the EU could consider deducting from its aid the 7 percent of the budget the PA pays to terrorists, and let the Palestinian people know the reason.

Or the EU could announce it is willing to spend that money on NGOs dedicated to fighting incitement in Palestinian society. Such credible threats might be enough. These and other measures designed to help change Palestinian internal discourse and policies won’t bring peace overnight, but may lay the foundations for a future agreement. What is certain, however, is that if the West follows the same worn-out peace-process formula that simplistically sees the Israelis as all-powerful and chiefly to blame for the conflict, and the Palestinians as innocent victims without agency, their efforts will be no more successful than previous attempts.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.