Twice in the past week, members of the Iran-Russia-Syria alliance challenged the U.S. and its allies. On February 7, a formation of pro-Assad units—apparently led by Iranian officers and comprising local Iran-backed militias, Afghan troops imported by Tehran, Syrian government troops, Russian mercenaries, and Russian-backed “Islamic State hunters”—crossed the Euphrates river and opened fire on the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). They thereby violated the “deconfliction” agreement prohibiting them from operating east of the Euphrates. Then, Iran sent a drone into Israeli airspace. Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights argue that the Islamic Republic is deliberately probing its adversaries and taking stock of their reactions:

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears to have spearheaded both of these recent provocations, in line with its long track record of conducting drone operations inside Syria and its leading role in coordinating the Assad regime’s offensive operations south of Deir Ezzour. The question is how the two tests are related, if at all.

[Furthermore], both incidents occurred against a background of growing Iranian confidence that the Syria intervention has saved the Assad regime, limited the United States to a tenuous foothold in the northeast [of the country], and allowed Tehran to establish a forward base of operations against Israel. The IRGC is now able to collect intelligence on Israel directly, reinforce and resupply Hizballah by land, and potentially transform the Golan Heights into an active military front.

Moreover, while Syrian and Hizballah drones have flown over Israel in the past, this is the first known incursion by an Iranian drone. . . . [T]he incident demonstrates that Iran is now willing and able to use Syria as a base for operations inside Israel, marking a new phase in tensions between the two adversaries. . . .

Given the likelihood that Iran will continue testing American and Israeli redlines in Syria, the Trump administration should pursue a more coherent approach. [One priority is] policing U.S. redlines more consistently. The United States might consider resuming strikes in response to future chemical-weapons incidents; these could justifiably be broadened to include nearby Iranian or proxy elements supporting Assad regime forces. Moreover, strikes on high-value Iranian targets not directly connected to such provocations would further complicate Iran’s calculations and make U.S. strikes less predictable. . . .

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.