Sunday night, two Syrian military bases were attacked, and reportedly a few dozen Iranian soldiers—or Pakistani Shiites fighting for Iran—were killed. There is much speculation that Israel carried out the strikes, perhaps in coordination with the U.S. In any case, not only are tensions between Jerusalem and Tehran growing, with the Islamic Republic determined to turn Syria into a launching pad for attacks on the Jewish state and the Jewish state determined to stop it, but, as Ehud Yaari explains, the situation is bound to escalate. Inevitably, he writes, Iran and the Syrian government will launch an offensive to dislodge rebels from the southern part of the country close to Israel’s border:

Iran is in no hurry to have a confrontation. [The Revolutionary Guard commander] Qassem Soleimani, his boss Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and his lieutenants seem to have abandoned for the moment their earlier plans to deploy Hizballah and other militias close to the Golan frontier. Prompting this reassessment was a series of pinpoint Israeli strikes [in 2015] against Iran-sponsored groups that [were making preparations] for terrorist attacks from Syrian-army-controlled areas near Quneitra, including by planting explosive charges and firing Katyusha rockets. . . .

Since August 2015, Iran has instead focused on its long-term campaign to deepen its offensive capabilities within Syrian territory. . . . Israel will face a difficult dilemma, [however], once an Iran-led assault toward [the southern city of] Deraa begins. Sending the air force and employing land-based missiles to stop the advance may well compel Assad and his Iranian patrons to retaliate, thus increasing the danger of a general flare-up. [But] clinging [instead] to the current Israeli policy of nonintervention in Syria would enable the Iranians to consolidate their dominance over hilltops along the border, from which they could threaten the Israeli Golan Heights with short-range rockets and mortars. . . .

Russian air-force participation in such an attack on Deraa would, of course, further complicate Israel’s calculations. The hotline between the IAF and the Russian-operated Hmeimim air base in Syria has so far successfully prevented any clash between Russian and Israeli pilots, and the top-of-the-line Russian air-defense systems in Syria have not locked their radars on Israeli planes, even while the latter attacked Iranian depots located near Russian military units. Israel would certainly be extremely prudent if faced with the risk of dogfights with the Russians. Putin . . . has proved disinclined to get involved in skirmishes with Israel over Syria, although at times he has expressed annoyance at Israeli strikes. . . .

[Q]uite a few regional players have a stake in preventing Iran from effectively taking over Syria. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan share the same distaste for what has been termed the “Shiite Crescent,” with Syria as its center of gravity. Each of these countries can be induced to contribute in different ways to a “stop-Iran” effort. . . . But, above all, to prevent an all-out Israel-Iran war, which could easily expand to Lebanon and Gaza, the United States must lend its support to a sustained Israeli campaign to destroy—when necessary and possible—Iranian facilities in Syria and to continue to raise the cost of [the Islamic Republic’s activities], to the point that both Tehran and Damascus will have to reconsider the viability of Soleimani’s project.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.