Sinn Fein, the Irish pro-independence party that for a long time sponsored the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as its terrorist wing, allied itself with the anti-Israel cause many decades ago. Now, writes Ruth Dudley Edwards, it still propagates hatred of the Jews and their country:

Sinn Fein . . . trains its gullible followers to be virulent anti-Semites. They fly Palestinian flags much less as a mark of their compassion for Palestinians than as a sign of their hatred of Israelis. Loyalists, [who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom], see Israel as beleaguered and fly Israeli flags not because they hate Palestinians, but because they hate republicans [i.e., those in favor of detaching Northern Ireland from Britain]. . . .

Pro-Zionist in the 1920s and 30s, when [Zionism] was seen as a plucky anti-British movement for self-determination, once the state [of Israel] came into being public opinion shifted to seeing it as a colony imposed by the British on the native population. Ignoring Jews’ ancestral rights and Arab intransigence and inhuman treatment of refugees, Israelis became the bad guys and Irish political leaders unthinkingly endorsed policies that would lead to the total destruction of Israel. . . .

Sinn Fein is stepping up its anti-Israeli activism, since these days it needs, for electoral reasons in the south, to pretend it wants reconciliation with unionists, so its foot soldiers need a legitimate target for hate.

It has been worryingly successful in spreading its poison. . . . Dublin’s Lord Mayor Micheál Mac Donncha is Sinn Fein’s most recent anti-Israeli poster boy. . . . He’s been a key player in persuading the council to support the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement (BDS), which seeks to strangle Israel, and demands the expulsion of its ambassador.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.