Surveying the entire history of the Jewish state’s relations with the Soviet Union and then Russia from 1948 to the present, Micky Aharonson investigates some of its many paradoxes. Most recently and notably, these include the two countries’ close military contacts and maintenance of at least a façade of friendship despite the fact that their strategic interests in Syria are diametrically opposed. Also, there is Moscow’s persistently expressed opposition to Sunni Muslim terrorist groups coupled with its diplomatic recognition of Hamas’s Sunni terrorist regime in Gaza:

Russian policy on the Palestinian issue and relations with the various Palestinian organizations are directly related to its interests in the Middle East and its desire to achieve the status of a superpower that mediates in regional negotiations. In recent years, Russia has . . . proposed an international conference in Moscow to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the participation of all the involved parties. . . .

Russia was [also] the first country to recognize the Hamas government in Gaza and received Hamas representatives for an official visit to Moscow. . . . The Russians have continued over the years to maintain open dialogue with Hamas. According to the Russians, their goal is to [integrate Hamas into the peace process] and to [garner its] support for the PLO and an Arab peace initiative. . . . In contrast to the [U.S. and even the EU], it did not . . . define [Hamas] as a terror organization. . . . This attitude is not the result of any particular sympathy for the organization but rather the Russian fear of a change in leadership by external intervention. The Russians are consistent in adopting [this] line . . . out of fear that such events will become legitimate in other [countries as well], including Russia itself.

Hamas, however, is not the main obstacle to Russo-Israeli concord:

Russia has an economic and even strategic interest in selling advanced weaponry and nuclear capability to countries that constitute a direct threat to Israel, while Israel has an economic and strategic interest in the sale of advanced weaponry to countries that are militarily and strategically sensitive from Russia’s viewpoint. [I]n the Second Lebanon War, for example, Hizballah made use of weapons provided by Russia to Syria, including Kornet and Metis missiles, which managed to damage even the latest model of Israel’s Merkava tank. . . . [T]he media later reported that Russia had provided intelligence to Hizballah during the war and that the Russian communication station on the Syrian border conveyed information to Hizballah forces. Since those events, Israel has continued to warn Russia—at dozens of meetings and at all diplomatic levels—of the “leakage” of weapons that had been shipped to Syria or Russian weapons that make their way from Iran into the hands of Hizballah. . . .

Russia for its part is highly sensitive to the sale of military knowhow and advanced weapons by Israel to former Soviet countries with which Russia has [poor] relations. Georgia is a prime example. In 2008, during the war between Russia and Georgia, Russia accused Israel of supporting Georgia by supplying it with arms. . . .

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.