Some 400,000 Israelis who consider themselves Jewish are not recognized as such by the country’s chief rabbinate, and are thus unable to marry other Jews legally. Of these, many—often immigrants from the former Soviet Union—are of partial Jewish descent and thus halakhically non-Jews, even if they came to Israel under the state’s law of return. Others are Ethiopian Jews whose status is uncertain, or converts whose conversions are not recognized by the chief rabbinate. Shlomo Brody suggests a halakhic solution:

The problem [from a halakhic perspective] is that many of these Israelis [of ambiguous status] have no interest in meeting the standards of observance required for conversion according to the majority of Orthodox rabbis, which includes [a] sincere commitment to abide by Jewish religious law [halakhah].

To prevent intermarriage in the early 20th century, such prominent rabbis as Ḥayyim Ozer Grodzinsky, David Tzvi Hoffman, and Benzion Uziel ruled it permissible to convert those who generally intend to observe the basic facets of Jewish law, even if their performance will be lackluster in certain areas. Yet most prominent halakhic authorities . . . have argued that Jewish law requires sincere intent to observe Jewish law in toto, which is the position of the current Israeli chief rabbinate.

[This requirement] raises an issue with converting children, who are presumed not to have sufficient maturity to take on such responsibility. The Talmud states that a rabbinic court, serving as their guardian, can accept [this responsibility] on their behalf. Once reaching the age of majority, the child can theoretically repudiate his or her Jewishness, but is presumed to consent unless otherwise stated.

This approach has been challenged [specifically in the case of] children of intermarried couples, since the child would be raised in a non-observant home and thus set up to sin. . . . Yet others . . . allowed such conversions. . . . Rabbi Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch, one of the most senior religious Zionist rabbinic jurists, has advocated converting any minors when so requested by their Israeli parents. He asserts that in contrast to the stringent positions taken in the diaspora, leniency on this matter today will prevent the scourge of intermarriage in the state of Israel. Moreover, Jewish Israelis, especially if committed to a basic modicum of religiosity, live by default with kosher food from the supermarkets, a national Jewish calendar, and a blossoming religious culture.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.