Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Iran has used its intervention on behalf of Bashar al-Assad to establish a military foothold in the country for itself and its Lebanese proxy, Hizballah. Fearing that Tehran is planning to turn this into a new front for attacking the Jewish state, the IDF has conducted numerous attacks on Iranian and Iran-allied positions in Syria. Tony Badran, Matthew R.J. Brodsky, and Jonathan Schanzer explain recent developments in Israeli strategy and outline how the U.S. can best assist its most important Middle Eastern ally:

Unlike in past strikes against Hizballah-bound weapons, when Israeli officials have remained mum and refused to accept responsibility, the IDF is now openly claiming credit for strikes against Iranian assets. . . .

For now, Hizballah appears willing, or perhaps forced, to absorb such blows. The Lebanese terror group understands that while Israel is stopping some weapons from getting through, it certainly is not stopping all. This has yielded an unspoken understanding between Israel and Hizballah: that Israel can strike repeatedly in Syria so long as it does not hit targets inside Lebanon. These rules effectively extend the period of calm between major wars in Lebanon—a shared preference for both Hizballah and Israel. . . .

[Since last fall, however], Israel has upped the tempo of its targeting campaign. . . . Declaring open season on Iran in Syria is now, without question, the Israeli strategy. It marks an expansion of Jerusalem’s longstanding policy of interdicting weapons shipments to Hizballah with the aim of forestalling the next war in Lebanon. This [expanded] posture signals to the Iranians and Hizballah that Israel is determined to destroy Iran’s significant military buildup in Syria. But more importantly, the Israeli leadership has signaled that, if it must, it is prepared to go to war. . . .

The Trump administration should make countering Iran its priority in the region. In practice, . . . the U.S. should deny Iran an operational line of communication on the ground between Iraq and Syria. To that end, it should maintain the American base at al-Tanf on the Jordanian border . . . [Furthermore], the administration should continue and intensify its sanctions against Iran [and also] impose maximum economic pressure against the Assad regime in response to its war crimes and ongoing human-rights abuses. . . .

Chaos has been building in Syria for years. To date, it has remained largely controlled and confined. But Iran’s efforts to change the equation represent a strategic threat. To prevent a war with Iran and its proxies, Israel has paradoxically had little choice but to escalate. The United States should unreservedly and publicly support Israel’s position. In so doing, it will not only deter Russia and help to degrade Iranian power, but it will also advance its own interests.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.