A Texas speech pathologist has recently filed suit on First Amendment grounds because a public school that hired her as a contractor asked her to sign a statement mandated by the state’s law against boycotts of Israel. When the incident was first reported in the viciously anti-Israel Intercept, a headline described the statement as a “pro-Israel oath.” Not only is that false, many of the details given in the article itself—which have since been repeated in many media outlets that picked up the story—are misleading or incorrect. David E. Bernstein sets the record straight and explains why the law does not violate freedom of speech:

Texas has a law banning state entities from contracting with businesses, including sole proprietorships, that boycott Israel. As a result, just as local governments require contractors to certify that they adhere to many other state laws—such as anti-discrimination laws and financial propriety laws—they also must certify . . . that their business does not boycott Israel. . . .

Note that, consistent with the language and obvious intent of the law, the school district certification applies to the business [of which the speech pathologist is the sole proprietor]. Contrary to what I’ve been reading all over the Internet, she is not being asked to pledge that she, in a personal capacity, will not privately boycott Israel, much less that she will, e.g., not advocate for boycotting Israel or otherwise refrain from criticizing the country.

[Regarding] the First Amendment issue, [this law is] no different from requiring a contractor to pledge that his business does not refuse to hire Muslims, or Jews, blacks, veterans, or another state-designated group. The sole-proprietor contractor, or the certifying officer for a larger contractor, is still permitted to refuse to invite a Muslim to his house for dinner, or to advocate against Muslims in any way he chooses. The business simply can’t engage in action that the state disapproves of. . . .

As a libertarian, I’m sympathetic that there generally should be a right to boycott, even in the context of government contracting. What I am not sympathetic to, however, is the notion that we should expand antidiscrimination laws and contract constitutional restraints on such laws until, and only until, someone figures out that they could apply these laws to causes and institutions the left doesn’t like, such as the military or Israel, at which time we suddenly invent a broad First Amendment right to boycott. That, in essence, is the position the ACLU has taken for the past twenty years or so, and at best it’s wildly optimistic about how politics actually works, and at worst it’s . . . intellectually dishonest.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.