In December of last year, the IDF launched Operation Northern Shield, which uncovered and destroyed six attack tunnels dug by Hizballah from Lebanon into Israel. Jerusalem had showed the Israeli-side openings of tunnels to the UN International Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—whose task is to ensure that only the Lebanese military is operating in the southern part of that country—but no action was taken in response. With the thirteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War approaching this Friday, Assaf Orion examines the failures of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the war and created UNIFIL:

While the United Nations reports thousands of patrols in the area without any findings, recent events proved that Israel has a credible intelligence picture penetrating even Hizballah’s clandestine and compartmentalized projects. Israel’s exposure of physical evidence sheds light on the absurdity of the UN’s declamations about the “lack of evidence” of violations of Resolution 1701.

[Likewise], there is a wide gap between the international community’s appeals to the Lebanese government and the simple fact that this government, whether as a hostage or as a willing accomplice, plays an active role in concealing Hizballah’s military and in enabling its activities against Israel and against the UN forces. Since Iran and Hizballah have seized control over politics in Lebanon, the Lebanese government is not the solution, but rather part of the problem.

[Thus] the gravest military threat to Israel’s security today has gradually emerged in Lebanon: a massive, forward array of Iranian firepower on Israel’s northern border, embedded in populated areas while enjoying a sovereign state’s protection and cloaked in international denial. . . .

Since it has become evident that the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south is not at the expense of Hizballah’s military forces there, it would be wise to temper international enthusiasm about reinforcing Lebanese forces. . . . Further assistance to the Lebanese army should be provided to units that pose no danger to Israel, such as those combating terrorist activities and border-security units, and assistance should be made contingent upon the fulfillment of Lebanon’s obligations [to keep Hizballah out of its southern region].

Earlier this month, an operative working for, or in conjunction with, Hizballah snuck across the Israel-Lebanese border and planted a sophisticated explosive near the town of Megiddo, which killed a civilian when detonated. On Thursday, another Iranian proxy group launched a drone at a U.S. military base in Syria, killing a contractor and wounding five American soldiers. The former attack appears to be an attempt to change what Israeli officials and analysts call the “rules of the game”: the mutually understood redlines that keep the Jewish state and Hizballah from going to war. Nadav Pollak explains how he believes Jerusalem should respond:

Israel cannot stop at pointing fingers and issuing harsh statements. The Megiddo attack might have caused much more damage given the additional explosives and other weapons the terrorist was carrying; even the lone device detonated at Megiddo could have easily been used to destroy a larger target such as a bus. Moreover, Hizballah’s apparent effort to test (or shift) Jerusalem’s redlines on a dangerous frontier needs to be answered. If [the terrorist group’s leader Hassan] Nasrallah has misjudged Israel, then it is incumbent on Jerusalem to make this clear.

Unfortunately, the days of keeping the north quiet at any cost have passed, especially if Hizballah no longer believes Israel is willing to respond forcefully. The last time the organization perceived Israel to be weak was in 2006, and its resultant cross-border operations (e.g., kidnapping Israeli soldiers) led to a war that proved to be devastating, mostly to Lebanon. If Hizballah tries to challenge Israel again, Israel should be ready to take strong action such as targeting the group’s commanders and headquarters in Lebanon—even if this runs the risk of intense fire exchanges or war.

Relevant preparations for this option should include increased monitoring of Hizballah officials—overtly and covertly—and perhaps even the transfer of some military units to the north. Hizballah needs to know that Israel is no longer shying away from conflict, since this may be the only way of forcing the group to return to the old, accepted rules of the game and step down from the precipice of a war that it does not appear to want.