On Tuesday, leaders of the Jewish state’s largest political parties, Blue and White and Likud, met to negotiate the terms of a coalition agreement—and failed to come to an agreement. If none of the parties in the Knesset succeeds in forming a governing coalition, there will be a third election, with no guarantee that it will be more conclusive than those that preceded it. Identifying six moves by key politicians that have created the deadlock, Shmuel Rosner speculates as to whether they can be circumvented or undone:

The last batch of Israeli polls are depressing. What we see in them is, well, nothing. . . . If elections were held today, the outcome would be much like the ones of last April and September: no majority for the bloc of the right; no majority for any feasible coalition of the center-left. That is, unless someone is willing to undo one of the six decisions that brought us to where we are.

It might be Avigdor Liberman, [leader of the staunchly secular Yisrael Beytenu party], deciding to join the religious-right bloc or supporting a narrow coalition that relies on the Arab parties. It could be [the Blue and White leader] Benny Gantz deciding to enter a coalition with Prime Minister Netanyahu. It could be the ḥaredi parties deciding to abandon Likud. It could be Likud leaders deciding to throw Netanyahu under the bus [and choose a new leader more amenable to potential coalition partners].

Most of these scenarios seem like flights of fancy.

This means another election in March and another attempt to form a coalition with numbers that don’t match the prerequisite. This means more months without a functioning government to pass a budget, more months without important decisions being made, more months of bickering and political fatigue.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.