On January 8, just five days after the U.S. killed the high-ranking Iranian general Qassem Suleimani in a retaliatory airstrike, Tehran responded by firing ballistic missiles at two American bases in Iraq. At first it seemed possible that the Islamic Republic deliberately aimed its rockets so as not harm U.S. soldiers, but, Uzi Rubin concludes, information made public since then strongly suggests that the lack of American deaths was “a matter of sheer luck.” Iran, which generally prefers to operate through proxies or in such a way as to maintain plausible deniability, not only took credit for the attack but boasted about its success.

After analyzing the missile strike and its aftermath, Rubin explains what Israel can learn from it:

Tehran [in this episode] showed a significant degree of self-restraint. Operation Shahid Suleimani, [as the Iranian military dubbed its retaliatory attack], was ultimately more of a demonstration than a decisive strike. As such, it did not diminish—and perhaps even augmented—American deterrence of Iran.

The killing of Suleimani—apart from being a serious setback to Iran’s quest for regional hegemony—was a body blow to the image and reputation of the Islamic regime and a humiliation within and without. [Therefore it] apparently crossed a threshold and compelled the Islamic regime to bet the whole house and take the almost suicidal risk of killing U.S. troops just for the sake of regaining the respect of its citizens.

[F]rom the perspective of the cognitive battlefield, the U.S. administration’s messaging was hesitant and contradictory, showing a lack of control over information directly provided to the media by individual U.S. troops, rather than through their spokespersons. This stood in sharp contrast to the focused, fluent, and forceful messaging of the Iranians. In today’s conflicts, the cognitive battlefield is only a fraction less important than the physical battlefield, if [not of equal importance]. It is the cognitive battlefield that decides the perception of victory or defeat. The IDF would be well advised to heed this lesson from Iran’s act of revenge.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.