In 2019, an Israeli backpacker named Naama Issachar was arrested at the Moscow airport, en route home from India, for possession of a modest amount of marijuana. She was sentenced to over seven years in jail, but was released in January after strenuous Israeli diplomacy. But of course Vladimir Putin demanded, and received, something in return. Shay Attias writes:

After decades of argument, [Putin] finally claimed Russian ownership of the Alexander Courtyard in Jerusalem, near the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The dispute over the courtyard began in 1917. In May 1948, the Soviet Union appointed a “Russian property-affairs commissioner” who “did everything possible to transfer this property [namely, the Alexander Courtyard] to the Soviet Union.”

Putin has dramatically upgraded the status of the Russian Orthodox Church during his tenure as national leader. In almost every major speech, he has made sure not only to mention the Church but to support its faith narratives. . . . He has regularly used the language of the Church and quoted from the Russian Bible, sometimes even using it to justify his foreign-policy steps.

Russia still enjoys a high degree of influence in formerly Soviet areas, and Putin understands that . . . Russian churches in Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia can all be used to boost that influence. As Putin just showed in Jerusalem, he is fully capable of using the Church to enhance Russian prestige.

In January, . . . Putin presented the Russian Orthodox Church with a precious diamond: the Alexander Courtyard. . . . The granting of sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem to a foreign power is a significant concession for Israel. Russian cultural and military imperialism are here to stay, and Putin is eager to expand them further.

Hamas declared yesterday that it won’t release more hostages “until further notice.” Given the timing and wording of the announcement—several days before the release was supposed to take place, and speaking of a delay rather than a halt—Ron Ben-Yishai concludes that it is a negotiating tactic, aimed at “creating a temporary crisis to gain leverage.” Therefore, writes Ben-Yishai, “Hamas may reverse its decision by Saturday.” He adds:

Israel cannot afford to concede to Hamas’s demands beyond what is already outlined in the agreement, as doing so would invite continuous extortion throughout the negotiation process, further delaying hostage releases.

The group sees the public outrage and growing calls for action following the release of hostages in severe medical condition as an opportunity to extract more concessions. These demands include not only a rapid start to negotiations on the next phase of the deal and an end to the war but also smaller, immediate benefits, particularly improved conditions for displaced Gazans.

Beyond these tactical objectives, Hamas has another goal—one that Israelis do not always recognize: inflicting psychological pain on the Israeli public. The group benefits from, and perhaps even draws strength from, the anguish and emotional distress in Israel, as well as the testimonies of freed hostages detailing the abuse they endured. Hamas wants these stories to be heard—not only to pressure the Israeli government but also because, in the eyes of its supporters, Israel’s suffering is its ultimate victory.