Surveying hundreds of Palestinian textbooks and teachers’ guides published between 2013 and 2019, Arnon Groiss finds no shortage of anti-Israel propaganda, which, he concludes, is even more virulent than what was found in the earlier crop of textbooks published in the previous decade:

These books are used in the Palestinian Authority (PA) territories, as well as in Gaza and in most schools in eastern Jerusalem. They are mandatory in all schools in these areas, including private ones and those operated by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). From the very start, the PA schoolbooks have featured [three fundamental premises regarding the conflict with Israel]: 1) de-legitimization of both Israel’s existence and the very presence of its six million Jewish citizens, . . . as well as the denial of the existence of Jewish holy places there, 2) demonization of both Israel and the Jews, and 3) advocacy for violent struggle for liberation, instead of education for peace and coexistence.

The PA schoolbooks published since 2016 have featured an alarming new phenomenon: the name “Israel” has been replaced in most cases by the epithet “the Zionist occupation,” thus deepening the formerly adhered-to line of non-recognition of Israel as a legitimate state and transforming a concrete entity—the state of Israel—into a mythical, all-evil, entity—Zionism—with accompanying [connotations] of fear and hatred.

Among the many examples Groiss cites is an eleventh-grade religious-studies textbook that states, “spreading corruption on earth is of the Children of Israel’s nature.” Other books praise the Munich Olympics massacre and other terrorist attacks, hailing their perpetrators as heroes and martyrs. Moreover, such propaganda is not limited to lessons in history, geography, and religious studies, but also appear in math, science, and language instruction. Thus a teacher’s guide for ninth-grade Arabic suggests that students be given “free time to reflect on the dangers of the Jews’ greedy ambitions in Palestine.”

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.