On Tuesday, the IDF began inducting members of its new class of conscripts, who, unlike their predecessors, can expect to serve for 30 rather than 32 months. The cut is the second phase of a 2015 measure that reduced service from a full three years; however, the Knesset has effectively given itself a year to reinstate the 32-month term. Yoav Limor argues that it should avail itself of this option:

The Finance Ministry pushed for the decision [to shorten military service] because it wanted to bring young workers into the job market, which would lead to faster growth and boost the nation’s GDP. . . . Prior to the coronavirus crisis, when unemployment was negative and there was a lack of workers, [that decision] made sense, especially when the IDF itself admitted that it didn’t need every soldier to spend a full three years in mandatory service. . . . Now, with over a million unemployed, it’s not certain that the Treasury will want to see soldiers discharged two months earlier than planned because, rather than helping generate money, they will need to be paid unemployment benefits.

The current chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi, thinks differently. His objection to another cut to compulsory service mainly has to do with the shortage of combat troops (Kochavi believes that combat units should be overstaffed to 108 percent, to allow for a surplus during wartime), but he has other reasons, too, . . . including the concern that reservists will have to be called up to cover the shortage of troops and concern about the military’s day-to-day functioning.

As for the argument that the new arrangement will help keep the military’s expenses under control, Limor is likewise unconvinced:

The IDF [itself] sees the financial aspect as minor compared to these issues. Soldiers on compulsory service are already “cheap” in terms of what they are paid, and do not comprise an undue burden on the military’s budget.

It’s [most] likely that a decision will be made [by the government] to freeze things temporarily [as they are], which would require agreements with the Treasury at an especially difficult time for the economy. It’s a shame, because for every possible reason—security, economics, values—it is time that Israel decides what it wants from its military and from those who serve in it, and what it is willing to do to make it happen.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.