In what is now the standard version of the two-state solution, a newly created Palestinian state would have as its eastern border the Jordan River. But such an outcome would pose a serious threat to regional stability—a fact behind Israel’s plans to extend its sovereignty to this strip of land. Yaacov Ayish explains:

The valley is a natural barrier and Israel’s longest border, separating Jordan from Israel and the West Bank. Compared to the pre-1967 armistice lines, it provides Israel with much-needed strategic depth. . . . Through Israel’s close security relationship with Jordan, this depth also extends east. Ties between Jerusalem and Amman are anchored by a 1994 peace treaty, and include extensive military and intelligence cooperation. Israel also supplies water and natural gas to the kingdom, which has limited natural resources.

By applying its law to the Jordan Valley, Israel would be able to contribute permanently to Jordan’s stability and its own. IDF forces already routinely thwart arms smuggling and other terrorist activities along the Jordan River. Continued Israeli presence will prevent the valley, and by extension the West Bank, from devolving into a terrorist haven akin to Gaza. Such a scenario in a territory adjacent to Jordan, whose population is majority Palestinian, would dangerously undermine Jordanian security. For Israel, when compounded with existing threats, it could be disastrous.

The territory’s topography likewise presents a clear advantage, allowing Israeli troops to . . . monitor incoming threats, whether from Jordan, Iraq, or Syria. It also requires any invading forces to launch an uphill attack when proceeding westward, making defense easier and granting Israel valuable time to mobilize reserve troops.

Steve Witkoff, the American special envoy leading negotiations with the Islamic Republic, has sent mixed signals about his intentions, some of them recently contradicted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Michael Doran looks at the progress of the talks so far, and explains why he fears that they could result in an even worse version of the 2015 deal, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA):

This new deal will preserve Iran’s latent nuclear weapons capabilities—centrifuges, scientific expertise, and unmonitored sites—that will facilitate a simple reconstitution in the future. These capabilities are far more potent today than they were in 2015, with Iran’s advances making them easier to reactivate, a significant step back from the JCPOA’s constraints.

In return, President Trump would offer sanctions relief, delivering countless billions of dollars to Iranian coffers. Iran, in the meantime, will benefit from the permanent erasure of JCPOA snapback sanctions, set to expire in October 2025, reducing U.S. leverage further. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps will use the revenues to support its regional proxies, such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis, whom it will arm with missiles and drones that will not be restricted by the deal.

Worse still, Israel will not be able to take action to stop Iran from producing nuclear weapons:

A unilateral military strike . . . is unlikely without Trump’s backing, as Israel needs U.S. aircraft and missile defenses to counter Iran’s retaliation with drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles—a counterattack Israel cannot fend off alone.

By defanging Iran’s proxies and destroying its defenses, Israel stripped Tehran naked, creating a historic opportunity to end forever the threat of its nuclear weapons program. But Tehran’s weakness also convinced it to enter the kind of negotiations at which it excels. Israel’s battlefield victories, therefore, facilitated a deal that will place Iran’s nuclear program under an undeclared but very real American protective shield.