Recently, the pentagon has floated the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from the multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai (known as the MFO), established in 1979 to reduce the likelihood of renewed hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Given the longstanding good relations between Cairo and Jerusalem—disrupted only when the Muslim Brotherhood ruled the country in 2012 and 2013—as well as the improving relations between Israel and other Arab states, this seems on its face like a reasonable move. Bradley Bowman and Amoreena York argue otherwise:

The MFO [has helped to prevent] war between Egypt and Israel for almost four decades—a stark contrast to five wars involving Egypt and Israel in the 33 years preceding the MFO’s establishment. Some are tempted to undervalue this accomplishment by dismissing peace as an inevitable outcome or foregone conclusion. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Consider the MFO’s role during the crisis of August 2012. Jihadists killed sixteen Egyptian border guards and then used their armored vehicles to attack Israeli forces. Cairo then sent a massive military force into Sinai that was not coordinated with Israel, sparking grave concern there.

In this case high-level diplomacy combined with the U.S. presence on the ground helped diffuse the possible crisis. Bowman and York continue:

Some may dismiss this [incident] as no longer relevant due to the relatively stable and constructive relations that Jerusalem and Cairo currently enjoy. However, a review of events in Iran in 1979 and Egypt in 2011-2012 caution against confident predictions regarding the future course of events in the Middle East. That is especially a concern in cases such as Egypt, where ill feeling in the general population toward Israel remains widespread.

The Sinai is home to a significant terrorist insurgency that includes militants who have sworn allegiance to Islamic State. The confidence that Israel has in the MFO’s treaty-verification processes allows Egypt to deploy additional combat power into Sinai to address the ongoing insurgency. The MFO’s ability to monitor these exceptional temporary deployments mitigates Israel’s legitimate concerns about the remilitarization of Sinai.

Finally, note Bowman and York, the American military presence there provides an important counterweight to China and Russia, which are both trying to expand their influence in the region at Washington’s expense.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.