Recently, the pentagon has floated the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from the multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai (known as the MFO), established in 1979 to reduce the likelihood of renewed hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Given the longstanding good relations between Cairo and Jerusalem—disrupted only when the Muslim Brotherhood ruled the country in 2012 and 2013—as well as the improving relations between Israel and other Arab states, this seems on its face like a reasonable move. Bradley Bowman and Amoreena York argue otherwise:

The MFO [has helped to prevent] war between Egypt and Israel for almost four decades—a stark contrast to five wars involving Egypt and Israel in the 33 years preceding the MFO’s establishment. Some are tempted to undervalue this accomplishment by dismissing peace as an inevitable outcome or foregone conclusion. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Consider the MFO’s role during the crisis of August 2012. Jihadists killed sixteen Egyptian border guards and then used their armored vehicles to attack Israeli forces. Cairo then sent a massive military force into Sinai that was not coordinated with Israel, sparking grave concern there.

In this case high-level diplomacy combined with the U.S. presence on the ground helped diffuse the possible crisis. Bowman and York continue:

Some may dismiss this [incident] as no longer relevant due to the relatively stable and constructive relations that Jerusalem and Cairo currently enjoy. However, a review of events in Iran in 1979 and Egypt in 2011-2012 caution against confident predictions regarding the future course of events in the Middle East. That is especially a concern in cases such as Egypt, where ill feeling in the general population toward Israel remains widespread.

The Sinai is home to a significant terrorist insurgency that includes militants who have sworn allegiance to Islamic State. The confidence that Israel has in the MFO’s treaty-verification processes allows Egypt to deploy additional combat power into Sinai to address the ongoing insurgency. The MFO’s ability to monitor these exceptional temporary deployments mitigates Israel’s legitimate concerns about the remilitarization of Sinai.

Finally, note Bowman and York, the American military presence there provides an important counterweight to China and Russia, which are both trying to expand their influence in the region at Washington’s expense.

In October, a young Mauritanian national murdered an Orthodox Jewish man on his way to synagogue in Chicago. This alone should be sufficient sign of the rising dangers of anti-Semitism. Nathan Diament explains how the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act (AAA) can, if passed, make American Jews safer:

We were off to a promising start when the AAA sailed through the House of Representatives in the spring by a generous vote of 320 to 91, and 30 senators from both sides of the aisle jumped to sponsor the Senate version. Then the bill ground to a halt.

Fearful of antagonizing their left-wing activist base and putting vulnerable senators on the record, especially right before the November election, Democrats delayed bringing the AAA to the Senate floor for a vote. Now, the election is over, but the political games continue.

You can’t combat anti-Semitism if you can’t—or won’t—define it. Modern anti-Semites hide their hate behind virulent anti-Zionism. . . . The Anti-Semitism Awareness Act targets this loophole by codifying that the Department of Education must use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition of anti-Semitism in its application of Title VI.