In 2018, Congress passed the Taylor Force Act, which withholds funding from the Palestinian Authority (PA) so long as it continues to reward terrorists and their families with cash. Willing to risk insolvency rather than abandon “pay-for-slay,” Ramallah has since then been cut off from American aid. The Biden administration, however, has pledged $150 million to the Palestinians over the next two years, which it plans to allocate to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). But, writes Dore Feith, recent decrees by the PA president Mahmoud Abbas undermine such efforts to help Palestinians without running afoul of the Taylor Force Act:

Before [2011], NGO directors decided how to dispense their assets. If they failed to do so, PA officials could step in, but they had to transfer the assets to private Palestinian associations “of a similar purpose.” Law-by-Decree No. 6, enacted in 2011, undid this protection by authorizing the interior ministry to overrule NGO directors’ wishes and transfer NGO assets to the PA treasury.

The 2011 amendment thus created an incentive for the PA, cash-strapped because of U.S. aid restrictions, to dissolve NGOs and to pour their assets into its own coffers. In 2020, the Arab Gulf states reduced their aid to the PA by 85 percent, intensifying its financial crisis. PA officials are thus even more motivated to seize NGO funds to make up for revenue losses.

In March 2021, Abbas issued Law-by-Decree No. 7/2021, all but erasing the line between government and civil society. The decree requires that NGO work “conform” with government plans. NGOs are now required to submit their work plans and estimated budgets for PA approval at the start of every year, and PA officials will be able to halt plans before they are begun.

The Palestinian Authority has put the Biden administration in a serious bind. It is not clear that the administration’s hope to revive U.S. aid through Palestinian NGOs can be fulfilled lawfully. If the aid doesn’t flow, it won’t be because President Biden does not want to send it. It would be because the PA has chosen not to make it a legal option.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.